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軟件商提供屏蔽不良信息軟件是否構成侵權?

—美國Zango案判決(中英對照版)

日期:2018-03-30 來源:央財知產研究中心 作者: 瀏覽量:
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*ZANGO, INC., Plaintiff–Appellant, v. KASPERSKY LAB, INC., Defendant–Appellee,568 F. 3d 1169 (9th Cir. 2009).


我們要做出裁判的問題是:在網絡媒體公司主張網絡安全軟件的經銷商干預其用戶使用可下載的軟件時,網絡安全軟件的經銷商是否有權獲得1996年《通信規范法》(《美國法典匯編》第47編230條)安全港規定的豁免。

We must decide whether a distributor of Internet security software is entitled to immunity under the safe harbor provision of the Communications Decency Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. § 230, from a suit claiming that its software interfered with the use of downloadable programs by customers of an online media company.


Zango股份有限公司(以下簡稱“Zango”)是一家互聯網公司,對于同意在瀏覽網頁時觀看廣告的用戶提供在線視頻、游戲、音樂、工具和程序等。Zango對Kaspersky實驗室(以下簡稱“Kaspersky”)提起訴訟,因為Kaspersky提供軟件用于過濾和屏蔽潛在的惡意軟件,但卻不當屏蔽了Zango的軟件。Kaspersky援引《通信規范法》230(c)(2)(B) 1關于過濾和屏蔽讓人反感的(offensive)信息材料的“善良的撒瑪利亞人(good samaritan)”保護規定。地方法院作出簡易判決支持了Kaspersky,判定Kaspersky是交互式計算機服務的提供者,其采取措施向他人提供技術手段以限制讓人反感的(objectionable)的信息內容訪問,應享有豁免權。上訴法院認同地方法院的觀點,維持其判決。

Zango, Inc. (Zango) is an Internet company that provides access to a catalog of online videos, games, music, tools, and utilities to consumers who agree to view advertisements while they browse the Internet.  It brought this action against Kaspersky Lab, Inc., (Kaspersky) which distributes software that helps filter and block potentially malicious software, for improperly blocking Zango’s software. Kaspersky invoked the protection of § 230(c)(2)(B) 1 for ‘‘good samaritan’’ blocking and screening of offensive material.  The district court granted summary judgment in Kaspersky’s favor, holding that it is a provider of an ‘‘interactive computer service’’ entitled to immunity for actions taken to make available to others the technical means to restrict access to objectionable material.  We agree, and affirm.


Zango公司有4個可供下載的軟件程序——Zango、Seekmo、Hotbar、Spam Blocker Utility。若消費者同意下載安裝其中之一并在瀏覽網頁時接收廣告,Zango則提供免費的目錄。對于Hotbar、Spam Blocker Utility這兩個軟件,Zango還提供了豪華版(premium version),如果用戶不想瀏覽廣告,可付費免廣告。

Zango has four downloadable software programs—‘‘Zango,’’ ‘‘Seekmo,’’ ‘‘Hotbar,’’ and ‘‘Spam Blocker Utility.’’  Zango provides free access to its catalog if customers agree to download and install one of these programs, and to receive online ads that are displayed as they browse the Internet. It also offers a premium version of ‘‘Hotbar’’ and ‘‘Spam Blocker Utility’’ for which customers may pay if they wish to access Zango’s catalog without having to view advertisements.


Kaspersky是位于俄羅斯的Kaspersky Lab ZAO開發的互聯網安全軟件在美國的分銷商,Kaspersky的產品中包括“Kaspersky網絡安全”(以下簡稱“KIS”) 和“Kaspersky 反病毒”  (以下簡稱“KAV”)。Kaspersky的軟件可以幫助過濾和屏蔽用戶不需要的惡意軟件(malware),這些軟件會危害電腦的安全和功能。惡意軟件危害用戶的隱私、損壞電腦文件,盜取身份信息,或者自動打開不需要的網頁鏈接,包括色情網頁等。

Kaspersky is the U.S. distributor of Internet security software developed by Kaspersky Lab ZAO, which is based in Russia. Among Kaspersky’s products are ‘‘Kaspersky Internet Security’’ (KIS) and ‘‘Kaspersky Anti–Virus’’ (KAV).  Its software helps filter and block unwanted malicious software, known as ‘‘malware,’’ that can compromise the security and functionality of a computer.  Malware works by, for example, compromising a user’s privacy, damaging computer files, stealing identities, or spontaneously opening Internet links to unwanted websites, including pornography sites.


Kaspersky軟件將Zango的程序定義為廣告軟件(adware),惡意軟件之一種。廣告軟件一旦被安裝,便會監視用戶的網絡瀏覽習慣,當用戶上網時并會自動彈出廣告。廣告軟件也可以打開連接,將用戶的計算機鏈接到存儲惡意軟件的網站或服務器上,使用戶的計算機暴露在感染中,占用其內存,讓計算機速度變慢,性能降低。基于這些原因,用戶并不喜歡彈窗廣告和廣告軟件,通常會安裝安全軟件來屏蔽廣告軟件。

The Kaspersky software classifies Zango’s programs as adware, a type of malware.  Once installed on a user’s computer, adware monitors a user’s Internet browsing habits and causes ‘‘pop-up ads’’ to appear on a computer screen while the user browses the Internet.  Adware can also open links to websites and computer servers that host malware and expose users’ computers to infection, and can swamp a computer’s memory and slow down computer speed and performance. For these reasons, pop-up ads and adware are unpopular among computer users, and consumers often install security software specifically to block adware.


Kaspersky的軟件會發現惡意軟件,這些惡意軟件可能存在于電子郵箱里、網頁上或者用戶要下載的軟件程序中。如果Kaspersky的軟件發現下載內容的特點和惡意軟件的特點一樣,那么就會警告用戶下載可能含有惡意軟件,理論上說(有爭議)Kaspersky的用戶可以選擇是否繼續還是放棄下載可能含有惡意軟件的程序。

The Kaspersky software detects malware that may be present in an e-mail, web page, or software program that a computer user is about to download.  If the Kaspersky software determines that the download has characteristics that are consistent with malware, the software warns the user that the download contains possible malware.  Theoretically (though this is contested), the user of the Kaspersky software then has the option whether to allow or reject the download of the potential malware-carrying program.


Kaspersky軟件通過網絡連接在線數據庫,并通過莫斯科的俄羅斯機構更新服務。安全軟件定期更新以緊跟惡意軟件的趨勢,因為惡意軟件始終在發展變化。Kaspersky軟件的用戶可以將軟件設置成自動連接在線更新服務器,也可以手動將他們的軟件與在線更新服務器連接。

The Kaspersky software is designed to communicate via the Internet with online databases and update services that Kaspersky’s Russian affiliate operates in Moscow.  The security software is designed to be updated regularly in order to keep malware definitions current, because new forms of malware are constantly being developed. A Kaspersky customer may configure the software to communicate automatically with these online update servers. Customers may also manually instruct their Kaspersky software to communicate with the online update server.


Zango公司宣稱Kaspersky的網絡安全軟件從兩個方面妨礙了Zango的用戶同時使用它們公司的軟件。首先,KIS禁用了Zango軟件的 “工具欄”特征,在網站用戶搜索一個特定主題的數據時,工具欄會在用戶瀏覽器頁面頂部放置相關廣告網站的鏈接。此外,Zango公司聲稱KIS實際上不允許其用戶同意Zango程序正在進行的操作。Zango主張,每次Zango程序想連接網絡,KIS會顯示一個警告,讓用戶選擇是否清除Zango或者“忽略”這條警告繼續瀏覽。然而,Zango公司聲稱,雖然KIS的警告包括一個“應用于全部”的復選框,旨在方便用戶阻止警告重復彈出而通過選擇“應用于全部”最終“忽略(警告)”,但這個復選框實際上是沒用的。也就是說只要選了“忽略(警告)”,那么即使選了“應用于全部”,還是會不斷出現警告。Zango稱這樣導致的必然結果就是用戶不得不放棄同時使用Zango和KIS軟件,從而允許Kaspersky的軟件清除Zango的軟件。

Zango alleges that KIS interferes with Zango customers’ concurrent use of the Zango software in two ways.  First, KIS disables the ‘‘toolbar’’ feature of Zango’s software, which provides a bar positioned at the top of the user’s Internet browser page that displays links to relevant advertisers’ websites to users searching for data on a specific subject.  Furthermore, Zango asserts, KIS does not actually permit Zango customers to consent to a Zango program’s ongoing operation.  Zango avers that each time the Zango program attempts to access the Internet, KIS displays a warning that gives the computer user the option either to block the Zango program or ‘‘skip’’ the warning.  However, while KIS’s warning includes an ‘‘apply to all’’ checkbox that presumably is meant to stop the repeated warnings if the user opts to ‘‘skip’’ and selects ‘‘apply to all,’’ Zango claims that the checkbox does not work. Consequently, a Zango user running KIS is forced to deal with constant warnings. According to Zango, the inevitable result is that a person using Zango and KIS concurrently gives up, thus permitting the Kaspersky software to block the Zango software.


Zango補充說,已經在使用KIS并想要下載Zango的人因KIS的這一做法而無法再下載Zango。當用戶想要下載Zango軟件時,KIS就顯示 “網絡防病毒警告”,建議用戶關閉Zango軟件的下載。“網絡防病毒警告”允許用戶點擊“允許(下載)” 而忽視警告,然而一旦用戶點擊“允許(下載)”,另一個新的“網絡防病毒警告”就會出現,稱Zango軟件不能被殺毒并拒絕訪問。Zango堅稱這最終使得Zango軟件不可能被安裝。

Zango adds that individuals who were already running KIS and who sought to download Zango software were prevented from doing so by KIS. When a user attempted to download Zango software, KIS displayed a ‘‘Web Anti–Virus Warning’’ that advised the user to block the Zango download.  The ‘‘Web Anti–Virus Warning’’ permitted the user to click ‘‘Allow’’ to override the warning and download the Zango program;  however, once the user clicked ‘‘Allow,’’ a new ‘‘File Anti–Virus Warning’’ appeared, stating that the Zango software could not be disinfected and that ‘‘write access is denied.’’  Zango maintains that installation of Zango software was made impossible as a consequence.


Zango稱,反間諜軟件行業的領軍者,比如McAfee、 Norton (Symantec)和Webroot都不存在類似的問題,并且這些公司會告知自己的用戶有Zango這款軟件并且給Zango用戶忽視建議的選擇。2007年3月至2007年6月,Zango用戶減少,Zango認為這是Kaspersky和其他反間諜軟件清除了Zango軟件的原因。

Zango states that it has not experienced similar problems with market leaders in the anti-spyware industry such as McAfee, Norton (Symantec), and Webroot.  Rather, Zango contends, these companies advise users of the presence of Zango’s programs and offer Zango customers the choice to ignore the advisory.  Zango attributes the decline in the number of its customers between March 2007 and June 2007 to interference with Zango software by Kaspersky’s software and by other antispyware software that similarly blocks the operation of Zango programs.


Zango軟件對用戶的威脅程度是爭議的問題。Kaspersky認為,Zango的軟件是廣告軟件,極有可能是間諜軟件。間諜軟件通常未經用戶同意或知悉相關信息就安裝在計算機上,暗中監視用戶的活動,使用戶密碼和機密信息處于被盜的危險中。Zango則主張其只有經用戶同意才會安裝軟件,并且提供了很容易從用戶電腦上卸載其軟件的方法。對于微軟系統的用戶,在用戶計算機屏幕右下角“開始”欄里找到Zango的圖標就有教用戶怎樣卸載的鏈接,在開始/程序菜單中也有“卸載ZANGO說明”。

The degree of threat posed to users by Zango’s software is in dispute.  Kaspersky contends that Zango’s software is adware, and possibly spyware.  Spyware, which is often installed on a computer without the user’s knowledge or consent, covertly monitors the user’s activities and exposes the user to the risk that his or her passwords and confidential information may be stolen. Zango maintains that it installs its soft ware only upon receiving user consent, and that it provides easy means of uninstalling Zango software from a user’s computer. For users of Microsoft’s Windows operating systems, these include a Zango icon in the system tray in the bottom right corner of a user’s computer screen, which leads to a link where users are informed how to uninstall Zango software, as well as ‘‘Uninstall Zango Instructions’’ available in the Start/programs menu.


Zango最初在華盛頓州法院提起訴訟,提出了包括禁令救濟、第三人侵害合同權利、違反《華盛頓州消費者保護法》、商業誹謗和不當得利的訴請。Kaspersky將這一案件轉移到聯邦法院。地區法院拒絕了Zango的臨時限制令的請求。Kaspersky隨后要求根據《聯邦民事訴訟規則》 12(b)(6)駁回原告的訴訟請求,當事人和法院認為這是根據《聯邦民事訴訟規則》第56條申請簡易判決。法院作出了簡易判決,理由是Kaspersky有權獲得上述《通信規范法》230(c)(2)(B)規定的豁免。

Zango initially brought this action in Washington state court, advancing claims for injunctive relief, tortious interference with contractual rights, violation of the Washington Consumer Protection Act, trade libel, and unjust enrichment.  Kaspersky removed the case to federal court. The district court denied Zango’s request for a temporary restraining order, and Kaspersky subsequently filed a motion to dismiss under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), which the parties and the court treated as a motion summary judgment under Fed. R.Civ.P. 56. Summary judgment was granted on the ground that Kaspersky is entitled to immunity under § 230(c)(2)(B).  


Zango在規定期限內提出上訴。

Zango has timely appealed.


Zango上訴請求的核心觀點是:如果探究國會的本意, 230(c)的法定豁免權的適用對象是互聯網內容的提供者,而不是提供過濾工具的公司。我們認為,對于向用戶提供過濾或屏蔽令用戶反感的信息材料的軟件的交互式計算機服務提供者,該法顯然是提供豁免的。

The heart of Zango’s appeal is that Congress intended statutory immunity under § 230(c) to apply to Internet content providers, not to companies that provide filtering tools.  We think the statute plainly immunizes from suit a provider of interactive computer services that makes available software that filters or screens material that the user or the provider deems objectionable.


[1] 230條是《通信規范法案》(以下簡稱“CDA”)的一部分,它為私人攔截或屏蔽令人反感的信息提供保護。CDA是“為了對未成年人接觸網上的不良信息進行控制”而制定的。Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1026 (9th Cir.2003).

[1] Section 230, which provides protection for private blocking and screening of offensive material, is part of the Communications Decency Act of 1996(CDA), Pub.L. 104–104.  The CDA was enacted ‘‘to control the exposure of minors to indecent material’’ on the Internet.  Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1026 (9th Cir.2003).


230(c)(2)(B)規定:

(c)對攔截和屏蔽令人反感的信息材料的“善良的撒瑪利亞人”的保護……

(2)民事責任

交互式計算機服務的提供者和用戶不因以下行為承擔責任:

(B)為信息內容提供者或他人提供或實現技術手段以限制對第1款規定內容的訪問而采取的任何行動。

Section 230(c)(2)(B) provides:

(c) Protection for ‘‘good samaritan’’ blocking and screening of offensive material

(2) Civil Liability

No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be held liable on account of—

(B) any action taken to enable or make available to information content providers or others the technical means to restrict access to the material described in paragraph (1).


豁免項下所屏蔽的材料包括“軟件提供者或用戶認為是淫穢、下流、色情、污穢、過度暴力、騷擾或其他令人反感的內容,不論這些內容是否受憲法保護。”(§ 230(c)(2)(A))

The material that can be blocked under the exemption includes ‘‘material that the provider or user considers to be obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, harassing, or otherwise objectionable, whether or not such material is constitutionally protected[.]’’ § 230(c)(2)(A).


法條將“交互式計算機服務”定義為“任何支持多用戶登錄的信息服務、信息系統、或者訪問軟件的供應商,特別是提供互聯網接入服務或系統的圖書館以及教育機構)”。230(f)(2)(著重強調)。

The statute defines ‘‘interactive computer service’’ as ‘‘any information service, system, or access software provider that provides or enables computer access by multiple users to a computer server, including specifically a service or system that provides access to the Internet and such systems operated or services offered by libraries or educational institutions.’’ § 230(f)(2) (emphasis added).


  “訪問軟件提供商”是提供實現下述一種或多種功能的軟件(包括代理和服務器軟件)或執行工具的提供商:(A)過濾、屏蔽、禁止訪問內容;(B)選擇、選取、分析或者摘錄內容。§ 230(f)(4)(A), (B).

“Access software provider’’ is defined in part as ‘‘a provider of software (including client or server software), or enabling tools that do any one or more of the following: (A) filter, screen, allow, or disallow content;  (B) pick, choose, analyze, or digest content.’’ § 230(f)(4)(A), (B).


[2]因此,只要供應商允許多個用戶訪問計算機服務器,軟件或執行工具(能夠過濾、屏蔽、允許或禁止淫穢、下流、色情、污穢、過度暴力或引起反感不適內容)的供應商對于提供技術措施采取的限制接入此類內容的行為享有豁免權。

[2] Thus, a provider of software or enabling tools that filter, screen, allow, or disallow content that the provider or user considers obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, harassing, or otherwise objectionable may not be held liable for any action taken to make available the technical means to restrict access to that material, so long as the provider enables access by multiple users to a computer server.


Zango公司超越法條的字面含義、依據立法歷史說明國會只打算給內容提供者豁免權。Zango特別指出,眾議院會議報告明確稱“[§ 230]條的一個特定目的就是推翻Stratton–Oakmont v. Prodigy案和其他把互聯網服務供應商和用戶當作內容(不是由他們制作的)出版者或發布者的類似案件決定,因為他們限制訪問令人反感的內容”。(H.R.Rep. No. 104–458, at 194 (1996) (Conf. Rep.).)。在Stratton Oakmont v. Prodigy Services案中,法院認為,Prodigy作為提供在線公告板的互聯網服務的提供者,需要為他人在其公告板上發布的誹謗性言論承擔責任。(1995 WL 323710 (N.Y.Sup.Ct. May 24, 1995).)。Zango借此推導出, “善良的撒瑪利亞人”所適用的豁免只保護信息提供者,否則他們可能要為他人制作的誹謗或淫穢內容承擔責任。雖然這的確是 230(c)的一個特定目的和保護所及范圍,但國會報告明確指出“善良的撒瑪利亞人”的保護適用于230(e)(5) 定義的所有的訪問軟件提供者[在230(f)(4) 又接著做了列舉]。訪問軟件的提供者包括任何“過濾、屏蔽、允許或禁止訪問內容的軟件提供者…或執行工具提供者…”因此,我們對條文的解讀與與會者的初衷一致。

Going beyond the statute’s plain language, Zango relies on legislative history to show that Congress intended to grant immunity only to content providers.  In particular, Zango points to the House Conference Report’s statement that ‘‘[o]ne of the specific purposes of [§ 230] is to overrule Stratton–Oakmont v. Prodigy and any other similar decisions which have treated [Internet service] providers and users as publishers or speakers of content that is not their own because they have restricted access to objectionable material.’’ H.R.Rep. No. 104–458, at 194 (1996) (Conf. Rep.).  Stratton Oakmont v. Prodigy Services held that Prodigy, an Internet service provider that provided online bulletin公告 boards, could be held responsible for libelous statements posted by others.  1995 WL 323710 (N.Y.Sup.Ct. May 24, 1995). From this, Zango infers that the good samaritan provision was intended only to protect information providers from liability they might otherwise have for defamatory or obscene content prepared by others. While certainly this was ‘‘one of the specific purposes’’ of § 230(c) and one of the protections it extended, the conference report goes on to make clear that good samaritan protections apply ‘‘to all access software providers, as defined in section 230(e)(5) [subsequently renumbered as section 230(f)(4) ].’’  H.R. Rep. 104–458, at 194.  And the definition of access software provider includes any ‘‘provider of software … or enabling tools that … filter, screen, allow, or disallow content.’’  Therefore, our reading of the text comports with the conferees’ expectations.


對過濾廣告和惡意軟件的程序提供者給予保護也符合國會在230條中明確表達的豁免目標。這涉及到五項政策目標,其中有兩項涉及到本案中的問題:“鼓勵技術發展,這樣能使因特網和其他交互式計算機服務的個人、家庭和學校等用戶,對收到的信息實現最大化的控制”,以及“為攔截和過濾技術的發展和使用除去不利因素,這樣的技術能讓家長限制他們的孩子接觸令人反感或不當的網絡內容”。隨著更多的軟件能夠攔截惡意軟件,用戶將能夠對傳輸到計算機的內容進行更多的控制。因此,為反惡意軟件提供者提供避風港保護與國會在230(b)(3)表達的政策相一致。惡意軟件也可能使用戶暴露于不良內容,包括鏈接到黃色網頁,鏈接到威脅用戶隱私、電腦安全以及身份安全的軟件。因此,對過濾惡意軟件提供者進行避風港保護服務于230(b)(4)中的政策——為過濾令人反感或不當內容的軟件發展清除障礙,否則他們將落入責任條款規制的范圍內。

According protection to providers of programs that filter adware and malware is also consistent with the Congressional goals for immunity articulated in § 230 itself. Five policy objectives are identified.  Of these, two read on the issues in this case:  ‘‘to encourage the development of technologies which maximize user control over what information is received by individuals, families, and schools who use the Internet and other interactive computer services;’’ and ‘‘to remove disincentives for the development and utilization of blocking and filtering technologies that empower parents to restrict their children’s access to objectionable or inappropriate online material[.]’’ § 230(b)(3), (4). As more software is developed to block malware, users will be able to exercise more control over the content that is transmitted to their computers.  Thus, affording the safe harbor to providers of anti-malware software aligns with the Congressional policy stated in § 230(b)(3). Malware may also expose users to objectionable content, including links to pornographic websites, or to software that can compromise the user’s privacy, computer security, or identity.  Thus, the policy stated in § 230(b)(4), of removing disincentives for the development of software that filters out objectionable or inappropriate material, is served by a safe harbor for providers of malware-filtering software who otherwise fall within the terms of the statute.


盡管以前我們曾對230(c)(1)規定的豁免做出過分析,這還是我們第一次考慮230條的具體適用。有關230(c)(1)可參見Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc., 565 F.3d 560, 563–64 (9th Cir.2009);  Fair Housing Council v. Roommates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157, 1162 (9th Cir.2008) (en banc);  Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, Inc., 339 F.3d 1119, 1122 (9th Cir.2003);  Batzel, 333 F.3d at 1030–31。230(c)(1) 的直接目標是解決Stratton判決造成的問題。230(c)(2)(B)則規范的是針對限制令人反感的內容而向他人提供或實現技術手段采取的行動。正如我們已經討論的,適用 230(c)(2)(B)來豁免屏蔽軟件的提供者符合起草者的目的以及法規中明確的政策。總的來說,與我們之前遇到的案子不同,這個案件提出了一個不同的問題和法律規定的不同目標。

This is the first time we have considered this particular application of § 230, although we have previously addressed immunity under § 230(c)(1).7  See Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc., 565 F.3d 560, 563–64 (9th Cir.2009);  Fair Housing Council v. Roommates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157, 1162 (9th Cir.2008) (en banc);  Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, Inc., 339 F.3d 1119, 1122 (9th Cir.2003);  Batzel, 333 F.3d at 1030–31. Section 230(c)(1) is directly aimed at the problem created by the Stratton decision. Section 230(c)(2)(B), on the other hand, covers actions taken to enable or make available to others the technical means to restrict access to objectionable material. As we have discussed, the drafters’ purpose and the plainly articulated policies of the statute are served by applying § 230(c)(2)(B) to immunize the providers of blocking software.  In sum, this case presents a different problem, and a statutory provision with a different aim, from ones we have encountered before.


然而,Zango對Batzel案的解讀是:該案暗示了230(c)(2)的豁免適用于為人們提供內容的網站運營者和互聯網服務提供者,而不是那些提供過濾內容工具或機制的公司。因此,Zango主張,基于我們在Batzel判決中的230(c)(2)“使服務提供者免受追訴,前提是基于違反合同或者不公平的商業行為刪除用戶上傳的內容” (333 F.3d at 1030 n. 14.), Zango認為,Kaspersky沒有提供可能出現令人反感的內容的服務,所以它不能從服務端上“刪除”用戶上傳的內容。質言之,Kaspersky賣的是過濾軟件,但不提供內容接入服務,所以Kaspersky不是法定豁免權的受益主體。我們不認為在Batzel案中我們是想表達這樣的觀點。我們認為, 230(c)(2)與Batzel案并不相關,當在描述230(c)(2)怎樣鼓勵“善良的撒瑪利亞人”時,我們分析的是那起案件中的情況。Batzel案涉及一個網站和一個論壇,可能享有230(c)(1)規定的豁免權。Id. at 1030–31。在那種情況下,我們關于“刪除用戶上傳內容”的表述說得通。相反,在現在這個案子中,Kaspersky將自己認為令人反感的內容通過技術手段限制他人瀏覽,這是一個不同的問題,可能享有的免責也不同。

Nevertheless, Zango reads Batzel to imply that the immunity in § 230(c)(2) was intended to reach website operators and Internet service providers who provide people with access to content, but not to companies that provide access to tools or mechanisms for filtering content.  For this it relies on our remark in Batzel that § 230(c)(2) ‘‘insulates service providers from claims premised on the taking down of a customer’s posting such as breach of contract or unfair business practices.’’ 333 F.3d at 1030 n. 14.  Zango contends that Kaspersky does not maintain a service on which objectionable material may appear and so cannot ‘‘take down’’ a customer’s posting from its service;   put differently, as Zango sees it, Kaspersky, which sells filtering software but does not provide access to content, was not an intended beneficiary of statutory immunity. We disagree that we meant to imply this in Batzel.  As we recognized, § 230(c)(2) was ‘‘not relevant’’ to Batzel, and when we described how § 230(c)(2) ‘‘further encourages good samaritans’’ we obviously had in mind the circumstances at issue in that case.  Id. Batzel involved a website and listserv, and potential immunity under § 230(c)(1).  Id. at 1030–31.  In that context, our comment about ‘‘the taking down of a customer’s posting’’ made sense.  By contrast, this case involves providing the technical means for others to restrict access to material Kaspersky finds objectionable, which is a different problem with different potential immunity.  


只要Kaspersky是交互式計算機服務的“提供者”或“用戶”,它就受 230(c)(2)(B)規定的保護,免于承擔民事責任。沒有人認為Kaspersky是“用戶”, Zango還認為Kaspersky不是服務提供者。

Kaspersky will receive protection under § 230(c)(2)(B) for civil liability so long as it is a ‘‘provider’’ or a ‘‘user’’ of ‘‘an interactive computer service.’’  No one has argued that Kaspersky is a ‘‘user.’’  In Zango’s view, Kaspersky is not a provider, either.


[3]根據230(c)的字面規定,我們同意地方法院認定Kaspersky是服務提供者的觀點。Kaspersky是一個“提供或使多個用戶能夠訪問計算機服務器的訪問軟件提供者”,所以它“提供”交互式計算機服務。230(f)(2)。Kaspersky是一個“訪問軟件提供者”,因為通過提供反惡意軟件的軟件,它“提供軟件…或執行工具 …過濾、屏蔽、允許或禁止訪問內容。”230(f)(4), (f)(4)(A).并且,根據230(f)(2)條文的字面意思,通過向用戶提供在線訪問其更新服務器,Kaspersky “提供計算機接入或使多個用戶能夠訪問其服務器”。

[3] We agree with the district court that Kaspersky is a ‘‘provider’’ of an ‘‘interactive computer service’’ under the plain terms of § 230(c).  Kaspersky ‘‘provides’’ an interactive computer service because it is an ‘‘access software provider that provides or enables computer access by multiple users to a computer server.’’ § 230(f)(2).  Kaspersky is an ‘‘access software provider’’ because, by providing antimalware software, it ‘‘provide[s] software …or enabling tools that …filter, screen, allow, or disallow content.’’ § 230(f)(4), (f)(4)(A).  And, under the literal provisions of § 230(f)(2), Kaspersky ‘‘provides or enables computer access by multiple users to a computer server’’ by providing its customers with online access to its update servers.


Zango 辯駁道,僅僅提供在線更新這一個特征不能滿足230(f)(2)對交互式計算機服務關于“提供或使多個用戶訪問計算機服務器”的定義,因為幾乎每個商業軟件應用程序都有能力通過互聯網進行更新,而230(f)(2)要求交互式計算機服務器能“提供或使個用戶能夠訪問計算機服務器”。據此,Zango認為,更新功能并不意味著應用程序本身就是一種允許多個用戶訪問服務器的服務。相反,Zango對“交互式計算機服務”提出了一種新的解釋,認為只有當計算機服務使人們能夠訪問互聯網或訪問互聯網上找到的內容,它才能被解釋為“交互式計算機服務”。我們不同意如此狹隘地解讀法律條文。從字面看,230條并不將“交互式計算機服務”限定在提供網絡接入的范圍,相反,它唯一要求的是“多個用戶訪問計算機服務器”230(f)(2)。

Zango argues that merely providing an online update feature does not satisfy § 230(f)(2)’s requirement that the interactive computer service ‘‘provide[ ] or enable[ ] computer access by multiple users to a computer server’’ because nearly every commercial software application has the capacity to be updated via the Internet.  For this reason, it posits, updating capacity does not signify that the application itself is a service that enables access by multiple users to a server.  Instead, Zango proposes a gloss on ‘‘interactive computer service’’ that would construe a computer service as ‘‘interactive’’ only if it enables people to access the Internet or access content found on the Internet.  We decline to read the statute so narrowly. As written, § 230 does not limit the definition of ‘‘interactive computer service’’ to services that provide access to the Internet;  rather, its singular requirement is for ‘‘access by multiple users to a computer server.’’ § 230(f)(2).


Zango 進一步指出,230(f)(2)這一條款要求Kaspersky為用戶(Zango將這些用戶定義為會主動尋找訪問途徑的用戶)提供訪問服務器上的內容。這個說法站不住腳,因為Kaspersky確實為用戶提供了訪問其服務器上惡意軟件新定義的權限。條文也并不要求用戶“主動”訪問,230(f)(2)只說了提供或使“多個用戶能夠訪問計算機服務器。” 毫無疑問,Kaspersky用戶可以手動,即主動,訪問Kaspersky服務器獲得新的惡意軟件定義。

Zango further maintains that § 230(f)(2) requires Kaspersky to provide users (whom Zango would define as persons who volitionally seek access) with access to content that resides on a server.  This argument is unavailing, for Kaspersky does provide users with access to the new malware definition content that is available on its servers.  Nor does anything in the statute require users to seek access ‘‘volitionally’’;  § 230(f)(2) merely speaks of providing or enabling computer access ‘‘by multiple users to a computer server.’’  In any event, it is undisputed that Kaspersky users can manually, i.e., volitionally, access the Kaspersky servers for new malware definitions.


此外, Zango質疑Kaspersky更新本身是否重要,提出用戶有可能通過其他方法更新,比如CD,而這不會受到230(c)(2)(B)條文的保護。即便果真如此,我們不理解為什么用戶可能通過不受保護的方式更新,會表明能提供在線更新服務的Kaspersky落在了法條保護范圍之外。

In addition, Zango questions whether the method by which Kaspersky updates itself matters at all, given that users could possibly be provided with updates by other means that would not be shielded by § 230(c)(2)(B), for example, by CD. While true, we do not see how the possibility that a similar service could be provided by unprotected means indicates that Kaspersky, which does provide updates that are via the Internet, falls outside the zone of protection.


給Kaspersky提供“善良的撒瑪利亞人”的保護并沒有像Zango所擔心的,會為所有的在線更新軟件提供者打開豁免權的大門,230(c)在(2)(B)規定的第二項要求可以避免這種局面出現。根據其規定,交互式計算機服務要得到豁免,必須提供技術手段以限制對令人反感的內容的獲取。因此,諸如文字處理器或視頻游戲之類的非過濾程序,不會獲得“善良的撒瑪利亞人”的豁免。“交互式計算機服務”只包含“信息服務、信息系統或者訪問軟件提供者” 230(f)(2),這一定義進一步限制了豁免的適用范圍。正如我們已經說明的,Kaspersky之所以在法定的“訪問軟件提供者”范圍內,是因為它是一個允許用戶“過濾、屏蔽、允許或禁止訪問的內容” 的軟件的提供者。230(f)(4)(A)。

Neither does clothing Kaspersky with good samaritan protection open the door to immunity for any and all software providers that offer online updates, as Zango fears.   The second requirement of § 230(c) in subparagraph (2)(B) cuts off that slippery slope.  By its terms, to qualify for immunity, the interactive computer service must provide the technical means to restrict access to objectionable material. Thus, non-filtering programs such as word processors or video games would not be subject to good samaritan immunity.  The universe is further limited by the definition of ‘‘interactive computer service,’’ which includes only ‘‘information service[s], system[s], or access software provider[s].’’ § 230(f)(2).  As we have explained, the reason Kaspersky falls within the statutory definition of ‘‘access software provider’’ is that it is a provider of software that permits users to ‘‘filter, screen, allow, or disallow content.’’ § 230(f)(4)(A).


Zango進一步提出了理由主張230(c)(2)(B) 不能適用,因為是Kaspersky而不是用戶判定了Zango是惡意軟件,這一做法使用戶使用Zango的愿望不能實現。Zango主張,將豁免權擴大適用至為他人提供過濾工具的互聯網計算機服務的(B)目規定,在此種情況下不能適用。

Zango argues that § 230(c)(2)(B) cannot apply for the additional reason that Kaspersky, rather than the customer, determines that Zango is malware such that it overrides the customer’s desire to use Zango.  In this situation, Zango submits, subparagraph (B), which extends immunity to Internet computer services that provide filtering tools to others, is not applicable.


[4]再次強調,230(c)(2)(B)條文保護“為提供或實現對 A 目內容進行限制訪問的技術手段而采取的任何行動”。通過提供反惡意軟件的軟件和惡意軟件定義更新服務,Kaspersky能夠實現且提供技術手段限制訪問惡意軟件。用戶選擇購買、安裝、使用Kaspersky的軟件。不論Zango對Kaspersky沒有為其產品的用戶提供無視安全軟件并下載和使用Zango的指控是否正確,毫無疑問的是Kaspersky已經為其用戶“提供了”限制訪問它定義為惡意軟件的內容的技術手段。因此,只要被攔截的內容是230(c)(2)(A)規定的令人反感的內容,Kaspersky就滿足(B)目的保護條件。Zango在上訴中并未主張Kaspersky沒有將Zango的軟件視為指定的法定類別之一的“其他令人反感的內容”。230(c)(2)(A), (B)。

[4] To repeat, § 230(c)(2)(B) provides protection for ‘‘any action taken to enable or make available …the technical means to restrict access’’ to material covered by § 230(c)(2)(A).  By providing its anti-malware software and malware definition update services, Kaspersky both enables and makes available the technical means to restrict access to malware.  Users choose to purchase, install, and utilize the Kaspersky software.  Regardless of whether Zango is correct in its allegation that Kaspersky does not provide users of Kaspersky products a choice to override the security software and download and use Zango, there is no question that Kaspersky has ‘‘made available’’ for its users the technical means to restrict access to items that Kaspersky has defined as malware.  Therefore, Kaspersky satisfies the requirements of subsection (B) so long as the blocked items are objectionable material under § 230(c)(2)(A).  Zango has waived any argument on appeal that Kaspersky does not consider Zango’s software to be ‘‘otherwise objectionable,’’ which is one of the specified statutory categories.  See § 230(c)(2)(A), (B).


Zango還主張,230條不是要豁免其指明類別的商業侵權行為。但是,我們解釋過230條是要給予商業侵權行為豁免。見Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill, LLC, 488 F.3d 1102, 1108, 1118–19 (9th Cir.2007)(該案中,法院認為CDA230條為州不正當競爭和虛假廣告行為提供了豁免)。無論如何,230(c)(2)(B)的目的就是要為提供或實現技術手段以限制對令人反感的內容的訪問的行為提供豁免。如果Kaspersky用戶(購買安裝了Kaspersky軟件來攔截惡意軟件)對Kaspersky軟件的功能不滿,他可以卸載Kaspersky,然后購買其他公司限制更少或更適應用戶需求的軟件。訴諸競爭與法條所表達的依靠市場來發展交互式計算機服務相一致。230(b)(1), (2).

Zango also suggests that § 230 was not meant to immunize business torts of the sort it presses.  However, we have interpreted § 230 immunity to cover business torts.  See Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill, LLC, 488 F.3d 1102, 1108, 1118–19 (9th Cir.2007) (holding that CDA § 230 provided immunity from state unfair competition and false advertising actions).  In any event, what § 230(c)(2)(B) does mean to do is to immunize any action taken to enable or make available to others the technical means to restrict access to objectionable material. If a Kaspersky user (who has bought and installed Kaspersky’s software to block malware) is unhappy with the Kaspersky software’s performance, he can uninstall Kaspersky and buy blocking software from another company that is less restrictive or more compatible with the user’s needs. Recourse to competition is consistent with the statute’s express policy of relying on the market for the development of interactive computer services. § 230(b)(1), (2).


正如Zango指出的,聯邦地方法院僅依據(B)目就駁回了它的請求。Zango敦促我們選擇基于(A)目而不去維持地方法院的決定,堅稱Kaspersky是否善意是還需要進一步判斷的事實。但是我們認為不需要考慮(A)目的豁免權,因為我們同意地方法院基于(B)目做出的豁免處理。

As Zango notes, the district court based its dismissal exclusively on subparagraph(B).  Zango urges us not to affirm on the alternative basis of subparagraph (A), maintaining that a triable issue of fact exists as to Kaspersky’s good faith.  However, we have no need to consider subparagraph (A) immunity because we agree with the district court’s disposition under subparagraph (B).


在某種程度上,Zango提出了一個不同的問題——表述中沒有善意的(B)目,是否應被解釋為暗含了善意(在(A)目有明確規定)的要素?該點爭論未在訴訟中提出。見 Eberle, 901 F.2d at 818。就當前的目的,我們認為(B)目只有一個限制條件:豁免的保護僅延伸至“提供或使他人能夠實現”技術手段的提供者,這些技術手段能夠限制用戶或內容提供者認為是令人反感的信息的訪問。

To the extent that Zango in reply raises a different issue—whether subparagraph (B), which has no good faith language, should be construed implicitly to have a good faith component like subparagraph (A) explicitly has—the argument is waived. See Eberle, 901 F.2d at 818.  For present purposes, we note that subparagraph (B) comes with only one constraint:  the protection afforded extends only to providers who ‘‘enable or make available to… others’’ the technical means to restrict access to material that either the user or the provider deems objectionable.


結 論


聯邦地方法院認定Kaspersky是《通信規范法案》(1996)所定義的“交互式計算機服務的提供者”正確。我們得出這樣的結論:一個過濾、屏蔽、允許或禁止淫穢、色情、污穢、過度暴力、騷擾或其他令人反感的內容的訪問工具提供者,提供或實現使他人獲得限制這些內容訪問的技術手段而采取的任何行動受到47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2)(B)的保護,而免于承擔責任。由于其軟件符合這些要求,Kaspersky有權獲得“善良的撒瑪利亞人”的豁免。

The district court correctly held that Kaspersky is a provider of an ‘‘interactive computer service’’ as defined in the Communications Decency Act of 1996.  We conclude that a provider of access tools that filter, screen, allow, or disallow content that the provider or user considers obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, harassing, or otherwise objectionable is protected from liability by 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2)(B) for any action taken to make available to others the technical means to restrict access to that material. As its software qualifies, Kaspersky is entitled to good samaritan immunity.


維持地方法院的判決。

AFFIRMED.


FISHER,巡回法官,同意判決結論,但基于不同的理由。

FISHER, Circuit Judge, concurring:


結合Zango的上訴思路,基于《通信規范法案》“善良的撒瑪利亞人”的豁免規定(即47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2)(B))的字面含義,我同意我的同事給出的結論,維持地方法院關于Kaspersky能夠獲得豁免而免責的判決。盡管如此,超越本案的事實將豁免權延伸,根據230(c)(2)(A)字面意思賦予屏蔽軟件的提供者單方面攔截內容提供者傳播的內容的權力,可能會帶來嚴重的問題。這種危險是法律析取語言表述造成的,法條允許屏蔽“淫穢、下流、色情、污穢、過度暴力、騷擾或其他令人反感的內容,不論這些內容是否受到憲法保護”,其中“其他令人反感的內容”就是一種開放式無邊際的措辭。見230(c)(2)(A),(B)。

I concur with my colleagues that the plain language of the Communications Decency Act’s ‘‘good samaritan’’ immunity provision, 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2)(B), given the way Zango has framed its appeal, compels us to affirm the district court’s judgment that Kaspersky is immune from liability.  Nonetheless, extending immunity beyond the facts of this case could pose serious problems if providers of blocking software were to be given free license to unilaterally block the dissemination of material by content providers under the literal terms of § 230(c)(2)(A).  The risk inheres in the disjunctive language of the statute—which permits blocking of ‘‘material that the provider or user considers to be obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, harassing, or otherwise objectionable, whether or not such material is constitutionally protected’’—and the unbounded catchall phrase, ‘‘otherwise objectionable.’’  See § 230(c)(2)(A), (B).


Kaspersky是一個“允許多個用戶訪問計算機服務器的訪問軟件提供者”。230(f)(2),它銷售屏蔽軟件是為使內容提供者或他人獲得限制Kaspersky認為“其他令人反感的內容”訪問的技術手段而采取的行動。230(c)(2)(A), (B)。Zango的軟件是否屬于230(c)(2)規定的“其他令人反感的內容”,這一點存在爭議,但Zango未在訴訟中就此提出主張。國會顯然希望計算機用戶有過濾工具來過濾網上泛濫的令人反感的內容,通過給攔截軟件的提供者免責一定程度上實現了這一意圖。見 230(b)(3).但是, 230(c)(2)(B)關于豁免的規定涵蓋的范圍非常廣,以內容屬于“其他令人反感的內容”為借口,屏蔽軟件提供者可能出于反競爭的目的或僅僅是惡意的想法,濫用豁免權來攔截內容。把關注焦點放在反競爭上,我擔心的是屏蔽軟件提供者無視用戶的選擇攔截競爭者提供的內容,并且當競爭者要求賠償損失時根據230(c)(2)(B)免責。我懷疑國會本意并非要230(c)(2)(B)如此寬容。參照Doe v. GTE Corp., 347 F.3d 655, 660 (7th Cir.2003)為什么一項為了免除互聯網服務提供者對令人反感的內容的制作者的責任的法律規定,最終會打敗侵權行為和犯罪行為的受害者的訴求?

Kaspersky is an ‘‘access software provider that provides or enables computer access by multiple users to a computer server,’’ § 230(f)(2), and its sale of blocking software is an ‘‘action taken to enable or make available to information content providers or others the technical means to restrict access’’ to Zango, which Kaspersky considers ‘‘otherwise objectionable,’’ § 230(c)(2)(A), (B).  Arguably, Zango’s software is not ‘‘otherwise objectionable’’ under § 230(c)(2), but Zango waived that argument here.1  Congress plainly intended to give computer users the tools to filter the Internet’s deluge of material users would find objectionable, in part by immunizing the providers of blocking software from liability. See § 230(b)(3).  But under the generous coverage of § 230(c)(2)(B)’s immunity language, a blocking software provider might abuse that immunity to block content for anticompetitive purposes or merely at its malicious whim, under the cover of considering such material ‘‘otherwise objectionable.’’ Focusing for the moment on anticompetitive blocking, I am concerned that blocking software providers who flout users’ choices by blocking competitors’ content could hide behind § 230(c)(2)(B) when the competitor seeks to recover damages.  I doubt Congress intended § 230(c)(2)(B) to be so forgiving.  Cf. Doe v. GTE Corp., 347 F.3d 655, 660 (7th Cir.2003) (‘‘Why should a law designed to eliminate ISPs’ liability to the creators of offensive material end up defeating claims by the victims of tortious or criminal conduct?’’).


在口頭辯論中,對于偷偷攔截用戶知情后其實想訪問的內容的行為被230(c)(2)(B)豁免的可能性, Kaspersky強調其軟件KIS在正常運行時會提醒用戶它將要屏蔽內容。這時,會出現一個彈窗,用戶可以不管KIS的警告單擊相應的按鈕來“允許”訪問相關內容。但是,Kaspersky認為230(c)(2)(B)的豁免不依賴于這樣的警告窗口或覆蓋選項。其他屏蔽軟件可能不那么受用戶喜歡,或者不提供這樣的覆蓋選項或者提供了但很難使用。舉一個假設的例子,一個網頁瀏覽器由供應商配置,用來過濾掉第三方搜索引擎的搜索結果,所以可以永遠屏蔽批評他或者對其競爭對手有利的網站。這樣隱蔽的、反競爭的攔截行為歸為法定豁免的行為——由訪問軟件提供者采取的、使提供者阻止其認為令人反感的內容的技術手段,還是值得商榷的。除非230(c)(2)(B)對攔截軟件提供者認為可以歸為“其他令人反感的內容”增加一些善意的限制條件,或者增加屏蔽行為必須與用戶的選擇一致的要求,否則豁免可能擴大適用于國會本不打算免責的行為。

When presented at oral argument with the possibility § 230(c)(2)(B) could immunize covert blocking of content the user would want to access—if the user knew about it—Kaspersky emphasized that its software, Kaspersky Internet Security (‘‘KIS’’), when properly functioning, warns the user that KIS is about to block content.  A pop-up window appears, and the user may ‘‘allow’’ the content over KIS’s warning by clicking the appropriate button.  But Kaspersky conceded that immunity under § 230(c)(2)(B) does not depend on the presence of such a warning or override option.  Other blocking software might be less accommodating to the user’s preferences, either not providing an override option or making it difficult to use. Consider, for example, a web browser configured by its provider to filter third-party search engine results so they would never yield websites critical of the browser company or favorable to its competitors.  Such covert, anti-competitive blocking arguably fits into the statutory category of immune actions—those taken by an access software provider to provide the technical means to block content the provider deems objectionable.  Unless § 230(c)(2)(B) imposes some good faith limitation on what a blocking software provider can consider ‘‘otherwise objectionable,’’ or some requirement that blocking be consistent with user choice, immunity might stretch to cover conduct Congress very likely did not intend to immunize.


計算機用戶可以根據喜好自由更換屏蔽軟件,這種市場導向的解決辦法也為立法支持。見230(b)(2)。但是我擔心的是,屏蔽軟件的提供者其中最方便和熟悉的例子就是網頁瀏覽器的提供者,會基于反競爭目的利用他們的軟件屏蔽掉競爭對手的內容,而用戶并不知道。如果用戶并不知情,就不會更換軟件,甚至不會向被屏蔽的提供者抱怨他們獲取不了想要的內容而通知內容提供者,將像Zango在此處所宣稱的那樣。

Computer users are of course always free to replace their blocking software with software more in line with their preferences, and this market-based solution finds support in the statute.  See § 230(b)(2). But my concern is that blocking software providers—providers of web browsers being the most convenient and familiar example—could employ their software to block content for anticompetitive purposes without the user’s knowledge.  If users are unaware of undesired blocking, they would not know to switch to different software or even to complain to the blocked provider that they are having trouble accessing its material, thereby tipping off the content provider such as Zango alleges happened here when its users complained.


國會認為,豁免能促進用戶使用屏蔽軟件,因此而讓互聯網更加安全,而不是相反。見230(b)(4).但在我假定的這種情況下,豁免會被濫用。然而,在國會明確法律規定的含義或者將來有案件能夠判決做出可能的限制之前,依據現有法律規定如此寬泛的措辭表述,我認為Kaspersky符合豁免條件。

In Congress’ judgment, immunity is necessary to facilitate users’ access to blocking software that makes Internet use ‘‘safer’’ than it otherwise would be.  See § 230(b)(4).  It would be an abuse of this immunity to apply it to blocking activity of the kind I have hypothesized here.  Nevertheless, until Congress clarifies the statute or a future litigant makes the case for a possible limitation, I agree that Kaspersky qualifies for immunity under this broadly worded statute.

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